# Exhibit 6

	Page 1
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2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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	In re:
4	: Master File No.
	Global Brokerage, Inc. : 1:17-cv-00916-RA
5	F/k/a FXCM, Inc. :
	Securities Litigation :
6	:
7	CONFIDENTIAL
8	REMOTE VIDEO DEPOSITION OF:
9	DROR NIV
10	THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2021
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24	REPORTED BY:
	SILVIA P. WAGE, CCR, CRR, RPR
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1	Page 42 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 44 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
		2	time.
2	<ul><li>Q. Was it in 2010?</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>	$\begin{vmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	
3 4	Q. Were you responsible for making the	4	Q. Were you aware of any issues relating to Effex that needed to be addressed before FXCM
5	final decision to take FXCM public?	5	went public?
6	A. The Board was and, you know, as	6	-
7	•	7	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.  A. We had a debate about whether to
8	Chairman of the Board, I was part of that.	8	
9	Q. Okay. And do you recall when FXCM's initial registration statement was filed with the	9	continue our no dealing desk model or to go back to the dealing desk model and we had an ongoing
10	SEC?	10	debate for the last few years of prior to
11	A. I don't recall the exact date. I	11	going public. And we decided that you know,
12	want to say probably around September of 2010,	12	so if we were you know, the decision to
13	maybe August, around that time.	13	continue and move all the business to the no
14	Q. Okay. And did FXCM take any steps to	14	dealing desk model, the rest of the business, if
15	prepare the company for going public before the	15	you will, no dealing desk model was made, then
16	registration statement was filed?	16	that decision is the decision that we basically
17	A. Yes.	17	made so we could not have a dealing desk inside.
18	Q. And in a broad sense, what were those	18	Q. And did that relate to Effex?
19	steps?	19	A. That related, yes, to so two
20	A. We made lots of, you know, lots of	20	things, one, that John could not be an employee
21	corporate governance changes, lots of, you know,	21	of FXCM and, two, that we were not going to buy
$\begin{vmatrix} 21\\22\end{vmatrix}$	different I don't recall now the this is	$\begin{vmatrix} 21\\22\end{vmatrix}$	Effex Capital.
23	over ten years ago, but, you know, I remember	23	Q. And "John" is John Dittami?
24	lots of changes.	24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Do you remember what say a couple of	25	Q. And why was it your understanding
1	Page 43 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 45 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	the most significant changes that the company had	2	that John could not be an employee of FXCM at
3	to make for?	3	that time?
4	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.	4	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.
5	A. Again, I don't recall because this is	5	A. It's just a direction that we wanted
6	11 years ago. But I know we had to get external	6	to move in.
7	board members that were not existing shareholders	7	Q. When you said, "could not be an
8	and, you know, independent Board members because	8	employee," was it your understanding that there
9	it was an MIC listed company, so you had to have	9	was some rule or law or issue that would prevent
10	majority independent board members, a whole bunch	10	him from being an employee?
11	of things around there.	11	A. It was just the optics of, you know,
12	Q. Were there any changes that the	12	how it would look like.
13	company had to make to its operations before	13	Q. And could you elaborate a little bit
14	going public?	14	on what you mean by "how it would look like"?
15	A. I don't recall at the time.	15	A. We wanted to have only external
16	Q. Were there any particular compliance	16	entities as market makers.
17	or legal concerns that the company had to address	17	Q. And at the time that FXCM went
18	as it prepared to go public?	18	public, was Effex a liquidity provider for FXCM?
19	A. I don't recall specifics.	19	A. Correct.
20	Q. Were you aware of any contractual	20	Q. And you talked about the debate over
20	Q y	I	
21	issues that needed to be cleared up before FXCM	21	whether to have a dealing desk versus no dealing
		21 22	desk and how that relates to Effex.
21	issues that needed to be cleared up before FXCM		
21 22	issues that needed to be cleared up before FXCM went public?	22	desk and how that relates to Effex.
21 22 23	issues that needed to be cleared up before FXCM went public?  A. Again, I don't recall. I mean, there	22 23	desk and how that relates to Effex.  Was what part of that debate was

Page 48  CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  it didn't matter public or not. It was shaped by what was going to be best, you know, for the interest of the firm and the interest of its clients in terms of, you know, can we provide a good trading — you know, as uperior trading experience to other firms, which was our competitive advantage. And, you know, we had a debate internally ongoing even after going public, should we go back, and that's why we had a debates whether to acquire Effex or not going forward, which is why there's so many documents about it, but in the end we decided not to buy Effex Capital.  Q. Okay. And to sort of wrap this up, I guess, this  Was there anything about FXCM going public that played a factor in the debate that you were discussing earlier about dealing desk cresus no dealing desk and Effex's involvement? A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CPO.  Was there anytoled in drafting.  D. Who at FXCM was involved or primarily involved in reviewing the reports?  MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.  Reviewing "when?  A. Define "reviewing."  Q. Did you review FXCM's annual and quarterly reports before they were filed?  A. Of course.  Q. And other than yourself, was there anytoled the that anytole anytole and the stock to go up.  A. The deabate is really not specific to once you're a public company, your results must be more consistent and predictable. And the results, you was public of the search of the results, you was public company, we wanted the stock to go up.  A. The can be a public company, we wanted the stock to go
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what was going to be best, you know, for the interest of the firm and the interest of its clients in terms of, you know, can we provide a good trading you know, a superior trading experience to other firms, which was our company, we wanted the stock to go up.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande's staff.  Q. Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande's taff.  Q. Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Thank you.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Who at PKZCM was involved or primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Q. Who at PKZCM was involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Mas there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Was there anyone else who was primarily involved in drafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.  Mas there anyone else who was primarily involved in rafting.  A. Robert Lande, the CFO.
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6 good trading you know, a superior trading 7 experience to other firms, which was our 8 competitive advantage. And, you know, we had a 9 debate internally ongoing even after going 10 public, should we go back, and that's why we had a 11 debates whether to acquire Effex or not going 12 forward, which is why there's so many documents 13 about it, but in the end we decided not to buy 14 Effex Capital. 15 Q. Okay. And to sort of wrap this up, 1 16 guess, this 17 Was there anything about FXCM going 18 public that played a factor in the debate that 19 you were discussing earlier about dealing desk 20 versus no dealing desk and Effex's involvement? 21 A. The debate is really not specific to 22 Effex. It's about specific to once you're a 23 public company, your results must be more 24 consistent and predictable. And the results, you 25 know, just needs and you need to grow and 26 Doviously, as the largest shareholders are 27 who would be the disproportionate beneficiaries, you 28 fow would be the disproportionate beneficiaries, you 29 and needed to keep being competitive 20 customer experience and most competitive customer 21 experience is what was going to, you know, carry 22 tu forward and that Effex is part of that 23 conversation, right. 24 Q. Okay. Once FXCM went public, did you 35 have any involved in reviewing the XFXCM so involved in reviewing the Ant RYCM sinnul and quarterly reports?  4 A. Define "reviewing." 4 A. Of course.  Q. And other than yourself, was there aquarterly reports before they were filed?  A. I mean, we had Ernst & Young and auditor and, you know, Counsel that you know, outside Counsel in a big firm in Manhattan, 1 forgot their name, that reviewed it. That's for sure. And the Board also reviewed it. Q. Okay. While you were reviewing the annual and quarterly reports before they were filed?  CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 5 CONFIDENTIAL -
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14 Effex Capital.  Q. Okay. And to sort of wrap this up, I 15 guess, this  Was there anything about FXCM going 17 Was there anything about FXCM going 18 public that played a factor in the debate that 19 you were discussing earlier about dealing desk 20 versus no dealing desk and Effex's involvement? 21 A. The debate is really not specific to 22 Effex. It's about specific to once you're a 23 public company, your results must be more 24 consistent and predictable. And the results, you 25 know, just needs and you need to grow and 26 therefore, you know, we cause shareholders are 27 buying it in order for a stock to go up. 28 buying it in order for a stock to go up. 29 buying it in order for a stock to go up. 30 buying it in order for a stock to go up because we would be the disproportionate beneficiaries, you 41 know, of such a thing. And, you know, for that 42 to happen, we needed to keep being competitive and needed to being on whatever provided the best on the papen, we needed to keep being competitive us forward and that Effex is part of that 29 us forward and that Effex is part of that 20 versus no dealing desk and Effex's involvement? 21 A. The debate is really not specific to once you're a 22 aditor and, you know, Counsel that you know, outside Counsel in a big firm in Manhattan, I 22 forgot their name, that reviewed it. That's for sure. And the Board also reviewed it. 23 guestions or concerns about the contents, did you have access to all the information you would need to satisfy your questions or concerns? 24 to satisfy your questions or concerns? 25
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16 filings with the SEC? 17 A. Yes. 16 were CEO? 17 A. Not that I recall.
17 A. Yes. 17 A. Not that I recall.
19 O And while you were CEO what was your 19 O Okay. So I'm going to call you to
18 Q. And while you were CEO, what was your 18 Q. Okay. So I'm going to ask you to
19 role with respect to FXCM's annual or quarterly 19 look back at Exhibit Share starting on, I
20 reports with the SEC, specifically?  20 believe, this should be Exhibit 3.
21 A. I would have to sign, right. And I 21 (Deposition Exhibit 3, Form 10-K for
had to present, you know, in the conference 22 the Fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, was
22 had to present, you know, in the conference 22 the Fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, was

	Page 62		Page 64
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	(entry, stop and limit) with dealing desk	2	Q. Was there a particular venture or
3	execution, why can't you see them with dealing	3	project that Mr. Dittami worked on while at FXCM?
4	desk execution?" Is that a section that you	4	A. Mr. Dittami was hired, essentially,
5	would have reviewed or approved the content for?	5	to help us figure out the problems we were having
6	A. Yes.	6	to analyze data and help us figure out the
7	Q. And the answer to that question, not	7	problems we were having with external liquidity
8	just the question itself, to be clear?	8	providers, other market makers and help fix those
9	A. You want me to answer that question?	9	issues. That was the reason he was
10	Q. No, no, I meant by would you have	10	Q. Sorry, you're trailing off at the end
11	been involved in the review or approval of the	11	there.
12	answer to that question here	12	A. So the original purpose was for him
13	A. Yes, yes.	13	to do data analysis and to go figure out the
14	Q as opposed to the question itself?	14	why we were having problems with some of our
15	A. Yes.	15	many of our liquidity providers.
16	Q. I just wanted to clarify.	16	Q. And other than the sort of analysis
17	A. Yeah, when I say, I approved a	17	figuring out these problems, was there any other
18	question, I approved the answer.	18	project that Mr. Dittami worked on while he was
19	Q. Yeah, thank you. I just wanted to	19	at FXCM?
20	make sure we had a clear record on that.	20	A. And so, once we could not filing out
21	MR. BAKER: Okay. I'm about to move	21	once we analyzed the problems and the issues
22	into a different section. We've been going about	22	the other people were having, we tried to get
23	an hour. Do we want to take a break now or push	23	them to fix it and when they would not
24	through? Either is fine with me.	24	sufficiently fix them, we hired Mr. Dittami to
25	MR. DAHAN: We can take a short	25	potentially look into basically setting up a
23	Witt. Britis it. We can take a short	23	potentiany look into basicany setting up a
1			
1	Page 63	1	Page 65
1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV break. That's fine.	2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV market making operation, you know, to fix it.
2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV break. That's fine. MR. BAKER: Alright. You want to	2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV market making operation, you know, to fix it. Q. And that "operation" was within FXCM?
2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV break. That's fine. MR. BAKER: Alright. You want to take five?	2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV market making operation, you know, to fix it. Q. And that "operation" was within FXCM? A. Yeah. So, as part of the debate that
2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV break. That's fine. MR. BAKER: Alright. You want to take five? MR. DAHAN: Sure. Thank you.	2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV market making operation, you know, to fix it. Q. And that "operation" was within FXCM? A. Yeah. So, as part of the debate that we were ongoing that if we could not fix these
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	Page 70	)	Page 72
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	Q. Which side of that debate were you	2	Q. Okay. When FXCM hired Mr. Dittami,
3	on?	3	did it enter into an employment agreement with
4	A. I was on the side of continuing	4	him?
5	external execution.	5	A. Yes.
6	Mr. Ahdout was on the withdraw from	6	Q. What was your role with respect to
7	external execution.	7	FXCM hiring Mr. Dittami?
8	Q. Okay. And, I guess, to be clear, so	8	A. I approved it.
9	while Mr. Dittami and his market making	9	Q. Were you involved at any other point
10	operations were still at FXCM, when you say they	10	in the hiring process?
11	continue external execution, was did you	11	A. I interviewed him.
12	consider Mr. Dittami's operation to be external	12	Q. Were you involved in negotiating the
13	execution at that time?	13	terms of Mr. Dittami's employment agreement?
14	A. Mr. Dittami was never operational,	14	A. Mr. Ahdout did all the terms.
15	you know, inside of FXCM. He conducted studies,	15	Q. Did Mr. Ahdout inform you or keep you
16	tests, you know, but we never went live.	16	aware of major terms that went into Mr. Dittami's
17	Q. And in those "tests," was that a test	17	employment agreement?
18	does that mean using his operation to provide	18	A. Yes.
19	liquidity for customers on FXCM's no dealing desk	19	Q. I'm going to introduce another
20	model?	20	exhibit. These things might take a little bit
21	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.	21	longer because they were not preloaded, so bear
22	A. By "test," I mean, we are basically,	22	with me.
23	yes, we are using him as a liquidity provider,	23	(Deposition Exhibit 31, Employment
24	right, to see if he improves the customer	24	Agreement 9/4/09 between Forex Capital Markets
25	experience.	25	LLC and John Dittami GLBR_00110697 to
	Page 7	1	Page 73
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	Q. And was there a particular segment of	2	GLBR_00110712 marked Confidential, was marked for
3	FXCM's trading volume that you intended for Mr.	3	identification.)
4	Dittami's operation to provide liquidity for?	4	Q. So this will be you might have to
5	A. It was different segments. It was	5	refresh the folder in Exhibit Share. This will
6	going to start in steps, you know you know,	6	be Exhibit 31. And, first, just please let me
7	for different segments of the clients that were	7	know when you're able to see it.
8	having more difficulties than others or we	8	A. Let me see. Employment agreement, I
9	thought it's not even "difficulties"; where we	9	see it.
10	thought that we could significantly improve it	10	Q. Okay. And I'm mostly going to ask
11	above what it is today and or at the time.	11	you some general questions, but feel free to
12	The year Imary do I namember the	12	review the entire document as you need.
12	The you know, do I remember the	12	, and the second
13	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was	13	MR. BAKER: For the record,
			•
13	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was	13	MR. BAKER: For the record,
13 14	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone	13 14	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.
13 14 15	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.	13 14 15	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697. Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're
13 14 15 16	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular	13 14 15 16	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697. Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.
13 14 15 16 17	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular segments? Was retail one of those segments?	13 14 15 16 17	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. Okay, let me see. You know, I don't
13 14 15 16 17 18	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular segments? Was retail one of those segments?  A. Yes.	13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. Okay, let me see. You know, I don't want to take up time reviewing 31 pages, so if
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular segments? Was retail one of those segments?  A. Yes.  Q. Okay. And at the time period still while Mr. Dittami was at FXCM, was the intent for	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. Okay, let me see. You know, I don't want to take up time reviewing 31 pages, so if there are any pages you want to ask about.  Q. Yeah. I'm just looking for you to
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular segments? Was retail one of those segments?  A. Yes.  Q. Okay. And at the time period still while Mr. Dittami was at FXCM, was the intent for his operation to provide liquidity to FXCM retail	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. Okay, let me see. You know, I don't want to take up time reviewing 31 pages, so if there are any pages you want to ask about.  Q. Yeah. I'm just looking for you to familiarize yourself with it generally, but I can
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	exact sequence of how that went, no. But it was not meant to be rolled out for everyone immediately all at once.  Q. Do you remember what particular segments? Was retail one of those segments?  A. Yes.  Q. Okay. And at the time period still while Mr. Dittami was at FXCM, was the intent for his operation to provide liquidity to FXCM retail customers?	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 31 GLBR 110697.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. Okay, let me see. You know, I don't want to take up time reviewing 31 pages, so if there are any pages you want to ask about.  Q. Yeah. I'm just looking for you to familiarize yourself with it generally, but I can go ahead and ask you. You know, like I said

	Dogs 74		Dog 74
1	Page 74 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 76 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	you recognize this document?	2	were aware of?
3	A. Yes.	3	A. I am not aware.
4	Q. And is this the Employment Agreement	4	Q. And moving to the next page, I'd like
5	between John Dittami and Forex Capital Markets	5	to focus your attention on Sections 4 and 5.
6	LLC?	6	Were you aware in 2009 that Mr.
7	A. I believe so.	7	Dittami's compensation was a base salary of
8	Q. When did you first see this	8	\$250,000 plus 30 percent of the profits generated
9	agreement?	9	by his venture?
10	A. I don't remember the date.	10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Do you remember when you excuse	11	Q. And so was it your understanding that
12	me.	12	at this time FXCM would split the trading profits
13	Was it in 2009?	13	generated by his venture with Mr. Dittami with
14	A. I don't I don't review legal	14	FXCM keeping 70 percent, if and when it traded?
15	documents. So, you know, would I have even seen		MR. DAHAN: Objection to the
16	a document in 2009, no. Do I know the major, you		reference of "his venture." Looking at the
17	know, compensation items, yes.	17	document it doesn't say its "his venture" but
18	Q. Okay. And so is it fair to say you	18	Other than that objection, you can
19	first became aware of this agreement and I'm	19	answer.
20	not asking for a particular date but around	20	A. The split was to be 70/30 had this
21	before or when it was signed?	21	venture got off the ground, yes.
22	A. Of course, yes.	22	Q. Okay. And when FXCM hired Mr.
23	Q. Okay. On the first page in the first	23	Dittami, did you have an expectation as to the
24	"whereas" clause, the agreements reads, "The	24	amount of profits that this market making
25	company and the executive desire to establish a	25	operation would generate on an annual basis?
	Page 75		Page 77
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	new division of the company managing certain of	2	A. We had no idea to do, that's why we
3	the company's algorithmic endeavors, which shall	3	were testing and we were experimenting phase by
4	include but not be limited to market making,	4	phase, client by client.
5	proprietary trading, algorithmic execution	5	Q. Did you have any expectation as to
6	services." And then it defines that as the	6	the order of magnitude of trading profits that it
7	"venture."	7	might accomplish when Mr. Dittami was first hired
8	Do you see that?	8	in terms of millions, tens of millions,
9	A. Yes.	9	thousands?
10	Q. And do you understand that to be the	10	A. Millions.
11	same venture as we were just talking about for	11	Q. Okay. In going back to Page 1 under
12	Mr. Dittami at FXCM?	12	Section 2, do you see a reference to a \$3 million
13	A. Yes.	13	initial investment?
14	Q. And did you ever consider this	14	A. Page 2.
15	venture to be a division of FXCM?	15	Q. Page 1, Section 2.
16	A. Had it got off the ground, that's	16	A. Oh, yes, okay.
17	what it was meant to be.	17	Q. Did FXCM sorry?
18	Q. Okay. And moving down to the Section	18	A. I see it, yes.
1 -	No. 1 "Employment."	19	Q. Okay. Did FXCM provide any of that
19	NO. 1 Employment.	1	
19 20		20	initial investment to Mr. Dittami?
20	Do you see the paragraph under that?	20 21	initial investment to Mr. Dittami?  MR. DAHAN: Objection. There's no
	Do you see the paragraph under that? A. Yes.		initial investment to Mr. Dittami?  MR. DAHAN: Objection. There's no reference here that it's to Mr. Dittami. Please
20 21 22	Do you see the paragraph under that?  A. Yes.  Q. When Mr. Dittami was employed by	21	MR. DAHAN: Objection. There's no reference here that it's to Mr. Dittami. Please
20 21	Do you see the paragraph under that? A. Yes.	21 22	MR. DAHAN: Objection. There's no

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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	MR. DAHAN: Come on.	2	A. Yes.
3	MR. BAKER: I'll rephrase.	3	Q. And Mr. Dittami writes, We went live
4	MR. DAHAN: Thank you.	4	today to FXCM Japan accounts only I'm sorry.
5	Q. Did FXCM provide any of the initial	5	"We went live today to FXCM Japan accounts only
6	investment referenced here to the venture	6	for 30 minutes"
7	referred to in this contract?	7	A. It said, "two pairs."
8	A. I believe a little bit of it.	8	Q. Yes.
9	Q. Do you recall, approximately, how	9	A. Yes.
10	much, was it a million, less, more?	10	Q. And this e-mail was March 19, 2010.
11	A. It was not a lot. I don't recall.	11	Do you see that?
12	Q. And do you recall if that amount of	12	A. Yes.
13	money was paid back?	13	Q. Do you know if Mr. Dittami was
14	A. No. I mean, it that money was	14	referring to his venture at to the venture at
15	again, we stopped the venture.	15	FXCM in this e-mail?
16	Q. Okay. I'm going to show you the next	16	A. Yes.
17	exhibit.	17	Q. What is "FXCM Japan"?
18	(Deposition Exhibit 32, e-mail string	18	A. Subsidiary of FXCM Holdings.
19	GLBR_00152843 & GLBR_00152844 marked	19	Q. A subsidiary similar in the way that
20	Confidential, was marked for identification.)	20	FXCM US was a subsidiary, another regulated
21	Q. This will be Exhibit 32. And please	21	entity
22	let me know when you can see it.	22	A. Correct.
23	A. I can see it.	23	Q in a different
24	Q. Okay. Please take a minute to	24	A. Right.
25	review.	25	Q in the space in Japan?
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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	MR. BAKER: For the record,	2	A obviously in Japan, yes.
3	Exhibit 32 is GLBR 152843.	3	Q. Thank you.
4	Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're	4	MR. DAHAN: You have to wait for him
5	ready. I'm just going to be focusing down on the	5	to finish, so this way the Court Reporter can get
6	e-mail in the second page.	6	both answers.
7	A. I'm ready.	7	A. Sorry.
8	Q. Okay. So I'll note that you're not	8	Q. Sorry. I think that was me too. So
9	on the top e-mails in this chain, but you appear	9	we'll both try to be better at that.
10	to be on the first two e-mails at the bottom of	10	Okay. So the accounts that are being
11	this chain here.	11	referred to here, do you know if these are retail
12	And is this an e-mail chain between	12	accounts?
13	Mr. Dittami and Mr. Ahdout, yourself,	13	A. I believe so.
14	Mr. Yusupov, Mr. Grossman and Mr. Sakhai, which	14	Q. And is it your understanding that at
15	then breaks off later to some of those	15	this time, these accounts would have been trading
16	participants?	16	in FXCM's no dealing desk model?
1	A. I'm sorry. Are you asking me if it	17	A. I don't recall. Most of the accounts
17		18	at the time were but not all of them.
17 18	is?	10	
		19	Q. And when Mr. Dittami says, "We went
18	is?		Q. And when Mr. Dittami says, "We went live today to FXCM Japan accounts," what do you
18 19	is? Q. Yes. A. That's what it looks like.	19	
18 19 20	is? Q. Yes. A. That's what it looks like. Q. Okay. And in the bottom e-mail from	19 20	live today to FXCM Japan accounts," what do you
18 19 20 21	is? Q. Yes. A. That's what it looks like.	19 20 21	live today to FXCM Japan accounts," what do you understand that to mean?  A. This was a test conducted for
18 19 20 21 22	is? Q. Yes. A. That's what it looks like. Q. Okay. And in the bottom e-mail from Mr. Dittami, the caption of the e-mail starts at	19 20 21 22	live today to FXCM Japan accounts," what do you understand that to mean?

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2	environment.	2	right.
3	Q. And this test were these actual	3	We were, you know, we went from
4	trades conducted, though?	4	six-person operation to one of the largest retail
5	A. Yes.	5	FX providers, in general, in the world, right,
6	Q. In the next paragraph of the e-mail	6	because we had a superior customer experience,
7	about the middle of the second line, Mr. Dittami	7	you know, and we wanted to make sure that we grow
8	writes, "P&L per MM was far above expectations."	8	that experience and got as far and above what we,
9	Do you see that?	9	you know, make most of our money on the venture
10	A. Yes.	10	was never going to be more than a rounding error
11	Q. And in this context, does "P&L per	11	in our financials. But it was to improve our
12	MM" refer to the venture's trading profits per	12	execution and to ensure that we are competitive,
13	million units of volume?	13	which would, obviously, be very important to
14	A. Yes.	14	bottom line to ensure that, you know, our
15	Q. And do you understand "P&L" to mean	15	customer experience, you know, is superior to
16	profit and loss?	16	others.
17	A. Correct.	17	Q. Okay. I'm introducing the next
18	Q. And that's the same whether it's	18	exhibit.
19	expressed PNL or P&L?	19	(Deposition Exhibit 33, e-mail string
20	A. Correct.	20	GLBR_00046387 to GLBR_00046388 marked
21	Q. And "per MM," do you generally	21	Confidential, was marked for identification.)
22	understand that to mean per million?	22	Q. Well, I guess, just before we do
23	A. Yes.	23	that, I want to clarify something in your last
24	Q. Okay. And that was going to speed	24	answer.
25	things up for later today. But if there's ever a	25	I think you said that "the venture
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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	question or you're not sure about it, feel free	2	was never going to be more than a rounding error
3	to ask.	3	in your financials."
4	Did you have any discussions with Mr.	4	A. Correct.
5	Dittami or others at FXCM about expectations for	5	Q. Before when we were looking at the
6	the venture's P&L?	6	employment contract, you were saying you said
7	A. I mean, we, obviously, had	7	that the general expectation was that the
8	discussions where, you know, he presented what he	8	operation would generate trading profit somewhere
9	thought would happen. We had no you know, he	9	in the millions, roughly; am I restating all of
10	was we did not know him very well, so he was	10	that correctly?
11	new. So we wanted to conduct tests to see how it	11	A. Correct.
12	was going to go.	12	Q. So, that the trading profits in the
13	Q. And so, when he says that, "P&L per	13	millions, is that what you're saying would be
14	million was far above expectations," was that	14	just a "rounding error" in FXCM's financials?
	was it your understanding that those were his	15	A. So revenues in 2010 were over
15	was it your understanding that those were ins		\$200 'II' G I
15 16	expectations or was that something shared, was	16	\$300 million. So, you know, as we made
	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was	16 17	\$10 million. So, you know, as we made \$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a
16	expectations or was that something shared, was		\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.
16 17	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was	17	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a
16 17 18	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was referral to that you're aware of?	17 18	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.
16 17 18 19	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was referral to that you're aware of?  A. His expectations.	17 18 19	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.  Q. Okay. That's fine. I just wanted to
16 17 18 19 20	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was referral to that you're aware of?  A. His expectations.  Q. Okay.	17 18 19 20	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.  Q. Okay. That's fine. I just wanted to clarify the order of magnitude that we're talking
16 17 18 19 20 21	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was referral to that you're aware of?  A. His expectations.  Q. Okay.  A. Our expectation was the majority of	17 18 19 20 21	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.  Q. Okay. That's fine. I just wanted to clarify the order of magnitude that we're talking about there.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	expectations or was that something shared, was there something, in particular, that he was referral to that you're aware of?  A. His expectations.  Q. Okay.  A. Our expectation was the majority of the money we make was is from trading with our	17 18 19 20 21 22	\$10 million or \$20 million, that would be a rounding error.  Q. Okay. That's fine. I just wanted to clarify the order of magnitude that we're talking about there.  Okay. So, to the next exhibit, this

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what? I'm sorry.

A. Outside -- again, if it's testing, it was testing internally but, you know, once it goes live for real, we only went live as Effex Capital.

Q. Okay. And were you aware in 2010 that FXCM would allow Effex to win ties with other liquidity providers?

A. So somebody has to win ties. And so what you usually do in a situation that, you know, if you look at the exchanges like NYSE or CME, you know, these kind of major trading venues, you know, the -- you first choose a price prove based on best price. But if two providers have best price, how do you decide who gets clicked on?

Generally speaking, that tie breaker is decided by trading size, okay. So the market maker who offers the largest trading size wins that tie. We told Mr. Dittami that in order, you know, for him to win the tie, he would have to provide a larger trading size. So, therefore, it would be commensurate with the logic that is on every major, you know, trading exchange in the

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world that, you know, volume -- not volume -- trading size is what the size -- the next most important factor after price in determining who wins. So, routinely, Mr. Dittami would offer trading sizes three to five times what the next LP would offer.

Q. And when you said -- I think you said, we told Mr. Dittami that for him to win the tie, he would need to have a largest trading size win that tie.

Was that true for other liquidity providers to win ties as well?

A. Yeah, that's the logic of the software.

Q. And were there other factors that went into the decision of who would win ties other than the largest size that was offered?

A. Yes. So is there the -- there is basically -- obviously, there's most competitive price is the No. 1 factor.

No. 2 factor is, you know, the issue of, you know, obviously, size and then there is the highest quality price in terms of how -- is it always available -- how is it -- excuse me,

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let me rephrase; how is it -- how available is it, which is a captured really by a rejection ratio, which is how often do you not honor that price and want to change it because the trade has gone against you.

And Mr. Dittami had the lowest rejection rate by far of any liquidity provider and lower by, you know, like 90 percent lower. So, you know, one of the problems we had with other liquidity providers was they were rejecting trades way too frequently, which led to customers needing to resubmit the order and hit the next best available price creating slippage, which means they paid, essentially, extra spread and we wanted to minimize that, again, to keep our competitive advantage. The slippage is a major issue.

As well as if a bank provided us with a price for a small amount, even if it was most competitive, we -- and we had hundreds of thousands of customers trading on these prices and there was more demand for that price than there was size available, then the first clients would get the price that they requested and then

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the next clients would, again, experience slippage where they would get the next best available price so we would be paying more and that's, again, a normal function in the market, which is why marketplaces, you know, offer advantage to size, so more customers get the size -- get the price that is displayed on the screen than not and minimize the slippage. That's why it's best practice.

- Q. And FXCM with respect to breaking ties, was the size offered always the first priority in terms of the deciding how to break the ties?
- A. Size and quality of price, yes, meaning, how low the rejection quality -- the rejections were. That would be the next two, yes.
- Q. So size was not always necessarily the determining factor?
- A. Yes, because if some bank decided that, you know, we had this issue with a number of people who would give us very competitive prices but then not honor them by a decent percentage of the time, when customers needed

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2	them the most and therefore would cause, you	2	Q. Okay.
3	know, customers to actually pay, you know, too	3	A. Because there were you know, at
4	much, you know, and there was you know, it	4	times, they were not quoting certain currency
5	was, essentially, a misleading best price. It	5	pairs or, you know, there were certain customers
6	was not real. Without being a low rejection	6	they would not yeah, there certain not
7	rate, the best price is not really the best	7	customers; customer segments that a, you know,
8	price.	8	would not quote, so I don't recall.
9	Q. Okay.	9	Q. Okay. But in that same time period
10	A. It's just a bait and switch.	10	from 2010 through 2014, is it fair to say that
11	Q. And were you involved in determining	11	Effex won ties the majority of the time for the
12	or in setting the system for which liquidity	12	currency pairs in which they were trading with
13	providers would win ties?	13	FXCM?
14	A. Yes. So, as you can see here, we at	14	A. Yes.
15	times gave advantages to Dresdner Bank, to	15	Q. Okay. I'm going to show you the next
16	Citibank, Goldman Sachs, to BNP, to other	16	document.
17	institutions. They just we experimented, you	17	(Deposition Exhibit 34, 4/12/10
18	know, prior to Mr. Dittami with lots of	18	e-mail forward from John Dittami to Alexander
19	different, you know, institutions in trying to	19	Kochel GLBR_00002696 & GLBR_00002697 marked
20	improve the trading operation for for our	20	Confidential, was marked for identification.)
21	clients. It's just we're not compelling enough	21	Q. Okay. This is Exhibit 34. Mr. Niv,
22	of an improvement.	22	just let me know when you can see it.
23	Q. And once Effex started trading with	23	A. It's not hold on. Okay, I can see
24	FXCM, was there a time when Effex did not have	24	it.
25	the ability to win ties?	25	Q. Okay. And please take a minute to
-	- the definity to will desi-		Q. Okay. Tind prouse take a minute to
	D 05		P 07
1	Page 95	1	Page 97
1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact	2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.
2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall	2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for
2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to	2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.
2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you	2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're
2 3 4 5 6	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and	2 3 4 5 6	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.
2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the	2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the mix or de-prioritized them more so. And we also,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready. Q. Okay. Mr. Niv, aside from the top
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the mix or de-prioritized them more so. And we also, you know, obviously, prioritized those who did	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready.  Q. Okay. Mr. Niv, aside from the top e-mail in this chain, is this an e-mail from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the mix or de-prioritized them more so. And we also, you know, obviously, prioritized those who did better.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready.  Q. Okay. Mr. Niv, aside from the top e-mail in this chain, is this an e-mail from yourself to a number of individuals including
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the mix or de-prioritized them more so. And we also, you know, obviously, prioritized those who did better.  Effex was always by far and away the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready.  Q. Okay. Mr. Niv, aside from the top e-mail in this chain, is this an e-mail from yourself to a number of individuals including Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Dittami?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. I don't recall. I don't recall exact specifics, if there was instances. I do recall the fact that we, you know, sent a scorecard to all our liquidity providers and, you know, if you rated too low, you were booted from the FXCM and we did boot some liquidity providers off of the mix or de-prioritized them more so. And we also, you know, obviously, prioritized those who did better.  Effex was always by far and away the best performer on all the metrics and there was a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV review.  MR. BAKER: As you do, I'll note for the record Exhibit 34 is GLBR 2696.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I am ready.  Q. Okay. Mr. Niv, aside from the top e-mail in this chain, is this an e-mail from yourself to a number of individuals including Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Dittami?  A. Yes.
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#### Page 98 Page 100 **CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV** 1 1 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 2 2 A. Yes. A. This was -- once we get comfortable 3 3 Q. Okay. So about halfway down your that we, you know, are seeing that we can live 4 e-mail where you write, "Steps we need to take 4 without those institutions, then we will be 5 and must be priority," and then there is a number 5 turning off some of them and handicapping others. 6 of numbered paragraphs, do you see that? 6 Because, again, as I explain in the last 7 7 A. Yes. question, it was the -- or second to last -- it 8 8 Q. And in paragraph numbered two you was if you are providing us a price that is the 9 9 write, "Once EES is reliably capturing a lot of best price but with a 20 percent rejection rate 10 flow, we turn off or severely handicap with extra 10 -- and that's a big switch -- it is not the best 11 markup some of the slower banks so we have EES 11 price, because 20 percent of the time -- and it 12 and fast banks only winning most of the business. 12 usually would come at 20 percent of the time when 13 13 Dresdner and UBS are at the top of the list to the market is really moving and the customer 14 14 get booted." needs you the most, you're not really there. So 15 When you say, "EES," does that 15 that price is, essentially, fake a percentage of 16 refresh your recollection as to whether you're 16 the time. So how reliable is that price matters. 17 referring to the venture at FXCM? 17 And so speed in terms of the slow 18 A. It's a technical configuration. So 18 banks, how fast they can determine that the trade 19 19 it refers interchangeably to the, you know, to has been executed, right, and how fast and how 20 the venture but that, you know, we'd refer to 20 much they wait to see whether they want to do the 21 21 Effex as EES too for a long time. trade or not matters a lot. And that's, you 22 So it's really a technical connection 22 know, because if this bank does not want it, we 23 23 in combination in the system that we sort of need to pass it to the next best available. So 24 24 designated for them on the -- you know, there's how fast we get -- they are evaluating and how no meaning for the actual word. 25 25 fast they respond to us is also a criteria, which Page 99 Page 101 1 **CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV** 1 **CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV** 2 2 Q. Okay. In this section of your is why, you know, we basically do not -- because 3 e-mail, were you talking about FXCM's retail 3 of all of these factors -- and there's others 4 trading? 4 that, you know, impact -- it's not a linear 5 A. Correct. As you can see from 5 situation, you know, of what is the best price. 6 Paragraph 2, there's the problems I was talking 6 And that is something that, you know, we had to 7 7 about -- Point 2. Problems I was talking about take into account and it was an ongoing process, 8 8 is that the slow banks basically would -- you you know, to improve this. 9 know, the metrics, basically, were terrible and 9 But that's what Effex did so well, 10 were costing our clients, you know, a lot of 10 right. So Effex had the lowest rejection rate, 11 money. 11 the fastest turn around time, the fastest 12 So we wanted -- we had a lot of 12 response rate and, you know, you can see it in 13 liquidity providers, over 15 at the time. And we 13 the performance. And not only did it tighten 14 wanted to, you know, the ones that were causing 14 spreads, but they, you know, eliminated enormous 15 problems for clients but could not do that 15 amount of slippage, you know, boosted our price 16 16 without sacrificing spread competition unless we improvement, you know, to our customers where 17 had Effex up and running tightening up spreads, 17 customers were getting a better price than they 18 you know, and making sure that our competition is 18 requested. So our price improvement percentages 19 still significant. 19 tripled because of Effex, you know, all of those 20 20 Q. Okay. And in this Paragraph 2 of things. 21 21 this section, were you instructing the people on Q. Oh, thank you. 22 22 your e-mail to stop trades from going to certain And when you mention, "extra markups" 23 23 banks or to severely handicap the ability of here, did FXCM apply -- the "markups" that you're

referring to, is that the banks or liquidity

providers would offer a bid or bid or offer price

24

25

those banks to win trades by adding higher

markups to their prices?

24

25

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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 104 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	to FXCM, FXCM would then add a markup to that	2	happened?
3	price before showing it to the customer; is that	3	A. I do not recall.
4	an accurate description.	4	Q. Do you remember if that was prior to
5	A. So our the entire business model	5	2015 or after?
6	of how we made money is our banks would offer us	6	A. I believe prior to 2015.
7	price. We would take the best bid offer of the	7	Q. Okay. And after 2010?
8	mix of those prices and add up a markup. So all	8	A. Yes.
9	trades had a markup. That was, essentially, our	9	Q. Okay. So was it is your
10	commission, okay, how we made most of our money	10	understanding that Effex would not have won as
11	as a broker. That was the hundreds of millions	11	much volume if you did not turn on or apply the
12	of dollars of revenue that we are talking about	12	extra markups to the slower banks?
13	between that and interest.	13	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.
14	And then because of what I explained	14	A. Essentially, they would win the same
15	previously, because of certain people would	15	volume. Unfortunately, they would be hit second.
16	essentially, their prices be less reliable,	16	So what would happen is that, you know, a
17	because their metrics were not very good, because	17	customer would click on a slow bank. The bank
18	they would reject a lot, you know, they would	18	would reject that customer. That order would
19	take too long, you know, and that would cause us	19	come back to us. We would have to route it,
20	let's say our metrics to decline with our	20	again, to the next best available bank or Effex
21	clients, we penalized them by putting extra	21	or other market maker.
22	markups.	22	And, unfortunately, time has now
23	Q. Okay. So FXCM would sometimes apply	23	elapsed. As the customer sent the order, the
24	different markups to the prices provided by	24	bank took a while looking at it, then said, no.
25	different liquidity providers?	25	We sent the order back and now we have to send it
	Page 103		Page 105
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	A. Correct. Depending on the quality of	2	to a different one, you know, this is, obviously,
3	the price that they sent, be it size, be it,	3	all in milliseconds, but this is robbing, you
4	again, rejection rate, speed of response, speed	4	know, execution time from the customer, which
5	of evaluation, you know, which is like what	5	then means that, most likely, the customer is
6	people refer to as hold time, all of that.	6	likely to receive a worst price, you know, from
7	Q. Okay. And just to, I guess, clarify	7	the next best available and not the price that he
8	one point in that workflow that you were	8	initially requested.
9	describing with the markups.	9	So we necessarily have the one a
10	So would FXCM apply the markups after	10	less flow, no, but they the customer
11	the best price was determined or would it apply	11	experience would be significantly impacted
12	markups to different banks and then taking the, I	12	because they would be they would have to wait
13	guess, combined price plus markup determine where	13	longer until they got executed and they would get
14	the best price was?	14	executed at worse prices.
15	A. No. We would add the system would	15	That was the whole theory behind why
16	change configurations on the system over years.	16	we would penalize on banks, you know, that were
17	In the beginning, we would add different markups	17	too slow or had unreliable statistics in terms of
18	to different banks and then we then we would	18	rejection rate.
19	aggregate the best bid offer of that, okay.	19	Q. Okay. So I'm about to move onto a
20	Over time we changed it to do it the	20	new document, I guess, a new section as well.
21	first way I described and we just we did not	21	We've been going about an hour. I don't know if
22	differential markups. We would booted, you	22	we want to maybe take a five-minute break now or
23	know, providers that did not meet the minimum	23	we can push through. We can take a lunch break.
24	standards.	24	I'm open to whatever, Mr. Niv. I don't know if
25	Q. Do you recall around when that change	25	you have a preference.

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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	THE WITNESS: Israel, you tell me	2	A. I don't.
3	what you want to do.	3	Q. Okay. Do you recall if it was around
4	MR. DAHAN: It's your call. We can	4	the time that Mr. Dittami left FXCM?
5	go another hour and take lunch. We can take	5	A. No. I'm pretty sure I saw this I
6	lunch now and go straight. It's however you want	6	don't honestly, I don't recall when I saw it.
7	to divide your day, Drew.	7	I know, obviously, that, you know because I
8	A. Yeah, let's do lunch now and then we	8	ultimately, you know, as a Board, you know, mad
9	can go no, problem.	9	the decision not to do this. So, you know, I
10	Q. Alright.	10	knew this was happening. So, I mean, I don't
11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're off the	11	need a letter to do that.
12	record 12:02.	12	Q. Okay. And in this letter. Mr.
13	(Lunch recess taken 12:02 to	13	Dittami writes in the last paragraph, "It is the
14	p.m.)	14	understanding of both parties to enter into a
15	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are on the	15	license agreement on economic terms similar to
16	record 12:32.	16	the employment agreement."
17	Q. Welcome back, Mr. Niv.	17	Do you see that?
18	(Deposition Exhibit 35, 4/4/10 letter	18	A. Yes.
19	to John Dittami and William Ahdout from William	19	Q. And this letter is also signed by
20	Ahdout E Capital 000049, was marked for	20	Mr. Ahdout on behalf of FXCM US?
21	identification.)	21	A. Yes.
22	Q. I've introduced the next exhibit, if	22	Q. Were you aware of the understanding
23	you want to take a look and let me know. This is	23	that Mr. Dittami references in this letter?
24	Exhibit 35. Let me know when you can see it.	24	A. Yes.
25	A. I can see it.	25	Q. And did you have any conversations
	Page 107		Page 109
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	Q. Okay. And please take a minute to	2	with Mr. Dittami about that understanding?
3	review.	3	A. Yes. So, you know, Mr. Dittami was
4	MR. BAKER: For the record,	4	going to open his own firm and is going to be,
5	Exhibit 35 is Bates stamped E Capital 49.	5	you know, taking on FXCM plus other clients.
6	Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're	6	
7			And, eventually, he had over 30 clients, I
1	ready.	7	And, eventually, he had over 30 clients, I believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was
8	A. I'm ready.	7 8	•
9	<ul><li>A. I'm ready.</li><li>Q. Do you recognize this document?</li></ul>		believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we
9 10	<ul><li>A. I'm ready.</li><li>Q. Do you recognize this document?</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>	8 9 10	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial
9 10 11	<ul><li>A. I'm ready.</li><li>Q. Do you recognize this document?</li><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami</li></ul>	8 9 10 11	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment
9 10 11 12	<ul> <li>A. I'm ready.</li> <li>Q. Do you recognize this document?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010?</li> </ul>	8 9 10	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial
9 10 11 12 13	<ul> <li>A. I'm ready.</li> <li>Q. Do you recognize this document?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> </ul>	8 9 10 11 12 13	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the
9 10 11 12 13 14	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document?	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we	8 9 10 11 12 13	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?  A. The P&L split of FXCM's trading of
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved. Q. Okay. And so you were aware at or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?  A. The P&L split of FXCM's trading of
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved. Q. Okay. And so you were aware at or around this time that Mr. Dittami and FXCM had	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?  A. The P&L split of FXCM's trading of FXCM's flow, right, but not, obviously, of flow outside of FXCM.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved. Q. Okay. And so you were aware at or around this time that Mr. Dittami and FXCM had terminated Mr. Dittami's employment contract? A. Correct. Q. And just, I guess, specifically, with	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?  A. The P&L split of FXCM's trading of FXCM's flow, right, but not, obviously, of flow outside of FXCM.  Q. Understood.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. I'm ready. Q. Do you recognize this document? A. Yes. Q. And is this a letter from Mr. Dittami resigning from FXCM on April 14, 2010? A. Yes. Q. When did you first see this document? A. I don't remember. But, obviously, we spoke about this even before that. So we knew that this was a foregone conclusion. A decision was involved. Q. Okay. And so you were aware at or around this time that Mr. Dittami and FXCM had terminated Mr. Dittami's employment contract? A. Correct.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	believe. Obviously, one of the big ones was FXCM.  But the payment for flow that we would get, right, that's kind of the initial thought was that it would mimic this employment agreement. It's not how we ended it. It's not what we decided at the end, but that was the initial thing.  Q. And when you say the payment for flow would "mimic" the employment agreement, what part of the employment agreement, in particular?  A. The P&L split of FXCM's trading of FXCM's flow, right, but not, obviously, of flow outside of FXCM.  Q. Understood.  So that's the 70/30 split that we

1	D 110		D 112
1	Page 110 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 112 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	with Mr. Dittami about maintaining that 70/30	2	A. I can see it.
3	split around this time in 2010?	3	Q. Okay. And please take a minute to
4	A. We were negotiating throughout the	4	review. I'm, generally, just going to be asking
	• • •		you some general questions about this. And
5	spring and summer over ways to skin that cat.	5	, ,
6	But because he was going to take over he was	6	but take whatever time you need.
7	going to take on other customers and do	7	MR. BAKER: For the record,
8	proprietary trading things that were not related	8	Exhibit 36 is Bate stamped E Capital 4.
9	to FXCM, you know, it made all of this and,	9	Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're
10	obviously, in trading you can't really sequester	10	ready.
11	one sort of flow from the other because at one of	11	A. I am ready.
12	these firms at these market making firms, they	12	Q. Okay. Do you recognize this
13	try to, obviously, scale up so, you know, they	13	document?
14	can buy from one client and sell to the next and	14	A. Yes.
15	cross that. That's how they make their money.	15	Q. And is this a Services Agreement
16	So it's really you can't really	16	between Effex and FXCM US?
17	put a percentage of FX of flow because the P&L	17	A. Yes.
18	is produced by the interaction of our flow with	18	Q. And that's dated the effective date
19	other people's flow too. So, at the end, it was	19	of March 1st, 2010?
20	not practical to do percentages and we did fixed	20	A. Correct.
21	amounts.	21	Q. Do you recall when you first saw this
22	Q. Okay. And so, that I understand you	22	agreement?
23	right, so you're saying it wasn't practical to	23	A. No. But I approved this agreement,
24	determine say a 70/30 split of only the trading	24	so I definitely saw it.
25	that came from FXCM as opposed from other	25	Q. And was that so around before
	Page 111		Page 113
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2		_	CONTIDENTIAL BROKEN
_	entities; is that what you're saying?	2	or around when it was signed is when you believe
3	entities; is that what you're saying?  A. Correct, correct. So, basically,		
		2	or around when it was signed is when you believe
3	A. Correct, correct. So, basically,	2 3	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?
3 4	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that	2 3 4	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so.
3 4 5	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know,	2 3 4 5	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would
3 4 5 6	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other	2 3 4 5 6	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed?
3 4 5 6 7	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other issues, he would take more or less depending on	2 3 4 5 6 7	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed? A. Yes.
3 4 5 6 7 8	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other issues, he would take more or less depending on how much scale he had and that's related to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember seeing drafts or
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other issues, he would take more or less depending on how much scale he had and that's related to another factors outside of FXCM.  And so, you know, we decided that a set payment is better and more market standard in accordance we were looking at what do all the major so payment for order flow is a standard practice for stock brokers. We were like what is, you know, standard practice that all the big firms on Wall Street were doing and so this was the fixed fee was more standard practice, so we went with the fixed fee.  Q. Okay. I'm showing you the next document.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember seeing drafts or reviewing drafts of this document? A. I don't recall. It's too long too long ago. Q. Did you exchange e-mails about this agreement before it was signed? A. I don't recall specifics. It's just too long ago. I'm sure it makes sense I would. I don't recall. Q. Have you ever referred to this agreement as anything other than the Services Agreement? A. I don't recall that either.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other issues, he would take more or less depending on how much scale he had and that's related to another factors outside of FXCM.  And so, you know, we decided that a set payment is better and more market standard in accordance we were looking at what do all the major so payment for order flow is a standard practice for stock brokers. We were like what is, you know, standard practice that all the big firms on Wall Street were doing and so this was the fixed fee was more standard practice, so we went with the fixed fee.  Q. Okay. I'm showing you the next document.  (Deposition Exhibit 36, Service	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember seeing drafts or reviewing drafts of this document? A. I don't recall. It's too long too long ago. Q. Did you exchange e-mails about this agreement before it was signed? A. I don't recall specifics. It's just too long ago. I'm sure it makes sense I would. I don't recall. Q. Have you ever referred to this agreement as anything other than the Services Agreement? A. I don't recall that either. Q. Do you remember hearing anyone else
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Correct, correct. So, basically, he'll be making money from other places but that money would I mean, he would make you know, depending market conditions and all the other issues, he would take more or less depending on how much scale he had and that's related to another factors outside of FXCM.  And so, you know, we decided that a set payment is better and more market standard in accordance we were looking at what do all the major so payment for order flow is a standard practice for stock brokers. We were like what is, you know, standard practice that all the big firms on Wall Street were doing and so this was the fixed fee was more standard practice, so we went with the fixed fee.  Q. Okay. I'm showing you the next document.  (Deposition Exhibit 36, Service Agreement E Capital-000004 to E Capital-000011,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	or around when it was signed is when you believe that you first saw it?  A. I believe so. Q. And is this something that you would have seen a draft of before it was signed? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember seeing drafts or reviewing drafts of this document? A. I don't recall. It's too long too long ago. Q. Did you exchange e-mails about this agreement before it was signed? A. I don't recall specifics. It's just too long ago. I'm sure it makes sense I would. I don't recall. Q. Have you ever referred to this agreement as anything other than the Services Agreement? A. I don't recall that either. Q. Do you remember hearing anyone else at FXCM referring to this agreement as other than

	D 110		D 120
1	Page 118 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 120 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	A. Yes.	2	at people, you know, that's why we have lawyers
3	Q. Okay. Please take a minute to review	3	internally. That's their job.
4	this document.	4	Q. Were you aware of anything in writing
5	MR. BAKER: For the record,	5	that rendered this agreement "null and void"?
6	Exhibit 37 is E Capital 50, 5-0.	6	A. No, I don't do the details.
7	Q. Mr. Niv, let me know when you've had	7	Q. Looking at Paragraph 1 of this
8	a minute to review.	8	document about halfway down the first page, is it
9	A. I know this agreement, you know.	9	fair to say
10	Yeah, I reviewed, yeah.	10	A. Yes.
11	Q. So do you recognize this document?	11	Q. Sorry. Is it fair to say that under
12	A. Yes.	12	this agreement, FXCM had the right to purchase a
13	Q. And is this an Option Agreement	13	70 percent interest in Effex for \$1?
14	between Mr. Dittami and FXCM US dated April 14,	14	A. Correct.
15	2010?	15	Q. Under the second whereas clause, it's
16	A. This is this is an agreement that	16	the third paragraph from the top, it says, "FXCM
17	Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Dittami signed, correct.	17	has loaned to Effex the sum of \$2 million
18	Q. Okay. And the agreement is dated the	18	pursuant to that secured promissory note dated
19	same day as Mr. Dittami left FXCM?	19	the date here of (the note) on terms more
20	A. Yeah.	20	favorable than Dittami would have obtained in an
21	Q. When did you first see this document?	21	arm's length transaction."
22	A. I don't recall the date.	22	Do you see that?
23	Q. Was it sometime around when it was	23	A. Yes.
24	signed?	24	Q. Is it true that FXCM loaned Effex
25	A. I would imagine so, yeah.	25	\$2 million?
	Page 119		Page 121
1	Page 119 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 121 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
1 2		1 2	9
	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV		CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this	2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically
2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed,	2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially,
2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed, were you generally aware of the agreement and what the basic terms of it? A. Excuse me.	2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially, collateralized the prime brokerage account to
2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed, were you generally aware of the agreement and what the basic terms of it?	2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially, collateralized the prime brokerage account to enable Mr. Dittami to get prime brokerage access
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2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed, were you generally aware of the agreement and what the basic terms of it? A. Excuse me. The again, this is part of the, you know, ongoing debate we had internally over, you know, when people like William did not, you	2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially, collateralized the prime brokerage account to enable Mr. Dittami to get prime brokerage access to the FX market, which he would not have otherwise been able to do as an independent institution. That is a service FXCM did for others as well.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed, were you generally aware of the agreement and what the basic terms of it? A. Excuse me. The again, this is part of the, you know, ongoing debate we had internally over, you know, when people like William did not, you know, still believe that we should roll back from external execution and they wanted to, you know, if Effex exceeds to buy out Effex Effex Capital. And we and he wanted to have this to help them get started to return to these options. But we, you know, we told him that it is not possible and we no longer THE STENOGRAPHER: I'm sorry, you cu out. A. We null and voided this document and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 tt17 18	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially, collateralized the prime brokerage account to enable Mr. Dittami to get prime brokerage access to the FX market, which he would not have otherwise been able to do as an independent institution. That is a service FXCM did for others as well.  You know, this was something that we I mean, he paid it after a few months and he got his own relationships. But this is in the beginning he had to, you know, to get going, we had to help him get going, which we did for a number of people in similar situations in the high frequency trading space like, for example, Lucid Markets, which we did end up buying, you know, for you know, we bought 50 percent, which I believe was 180 or \$150 million in 2013.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. And were you aware of before this before or around when this document was signed, were you generally aware of the agreement and what the basic terms of it? A. Excuse me. The again, this is part of the, you know, ongoing debate we had internally over, you know, when people like William did not, you know, still believe that we should roll back from external execution and they wanted to, you know, if Effex exceeds to buy out Effex Effex Capital. And we and he wanted to have this to help them get started to return to these options. But we, you know, we told him that it is not possible and we no longer THE STENOGRAPHER: I'm sorry, you cu out. A. We null and voided this document and told both him and Mr. Dittami that this is not possible, you know, our legal team said this is, you know, not doable.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 t17 18 19 20 21 22	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  A. No. So FXCM I mean, technically semi-true but not really. FXCM, essentially, collateralized the prime brokerage account to enable Mr. Dittami to get prime brokerage access to the FX market, which he would not have otherwise been able to do as an independent institution. That is a service FXCM did for others as well.  You know, this was something that we I mean, he paid it after a few months and he got his own relationships. But this is in the beginning he had to, you know, to get going, we had to help him get going, which we did for a number of people in similar situations in the high frequency trading space like, for example, Lucid Markets, which we did end up buying, you know, for you know, we bought 50 percent, which I believe was 180 or \$150 million in 2013.  But in 2009, 2010, we did help him get going with the exact same arrangement, this prime brokerage arrangement.
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1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	which Effex then paid back you said after a few	2	you know, people in that department work with
3	months?	3	him, you know, to help him interface better with
4	A. Correct.	4	the FXCM system. Again, we used to do that for a
5	Q. Did Effex pay any interest on this	5	whole bunch of people each in a different
6	amount of money?	6	circumstance.
7	A. I don't know the specifics.	7	But, you know, generally, the
8	Q. Would you agree that the terms of	8	incubating incubation services that, you know,
9	that say financial transaction were more	9	multiple prime of primes offer, you know, that's
10	favorable than for Mr. Dittami than he would have	10	not an abnormal relationship. You know, I think
11	been able to obtain in an arm's length	11	that it was limited to this.
12	transaction?	12	Q. Okay. I'm going to show you the next
13	MR. DAHAN: Objection to form.	13	document.
14	A. It depends on I mean, it really	14	(Deposition Exhibit 38, 4/14/10
15	depends on how much somebody else believed that	15	e-mail from John Dittami to David Sassoon
16	they wanted his business. I mean, it's clearly	16	GLBR_00189079 marked Confidential, was marked for
17	we would have done that high frequency trading	17	identification.)
18	space in those times was a very attractive, you	18	Q. This is Exhibit 38 and please let me
19	know, business. And Lucid, you know, and other	19	know when you can see it.
20	firms, you know, were making a lot of money by	20	A. I can see it.
21	arbitrage was in between financial institution	21	Q. Okay. And I'll note that you do not
22	exchanges was very easy easier at the time.	22	appear on this e-mail, but please take a minute
23	It was not as competitive a business. This was	23	to review. I'm just going to ask you some
24	the business that everybody was trying to get	24	well, I'll ask you a few questions.
25	into and, you know, we as well. So we, clearly,	25	MR. BAKER: For the record,
	Page 123		Page 125
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
		1	
2	did this for, you know, a number of people, you	2	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.
2 3	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.		Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're
	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it	2	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.
3	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would	2 3	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.
3 4 5 6	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you	2 3 4 5 6	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.  Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is
3 4 5	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't	2 3 4 5 6 7	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.  Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.  Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall.  Q. Okay. But do you see that would
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.  But, I think, you know, at the end of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.  Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall.  Q. Okay. But do you see that would you agree this appears to be an e-mail from Mr.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.  But, I think, you know, at the end of the day it doesn't matter because we did not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready.  Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall.  Q. Okay. But do you see that would you agree this appears to be an e-mail from Mr. Dittami to David Sassoon, Mr. Ahdout and
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.  But, I think, you know, at the end of the day it doesn't matter because we did not we helped him get started, but we did not, you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready. Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall. Q. Okay. But do you see that would you agree this appears to be an e-mail from Mr. Dittami to David Sassoon, Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Grossman?
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.  But, I think, you know, at the end of the day it doesn't matter because we did not we helped him get started, but we did not, you know, exercise this option or do anything, you know. We null and voided this agreement.  Q. When you say, "we helped him get started," were there other ways in which FXCM helped Effex get started?  A. Yes.  Q. Such as what?  A. We temporarily gave him office space.  We have a department in FXCM called Programming	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready. Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall. Q. Okay. But do you see that would you agree this appears to be an e-mail from Mr. Dittami to David Sassoon, Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Grossman?  A. Yes. Q. And Mr. Dittami writes, "Just to confirm steps for meeting."  Based on the context of this e-mail and the date, do you remember if you attended that meeting?  A. I have no idea. No, I don't recall. Q. Do you remember if you would have been, at least, aware of this meeting?
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	did this for, you know, a number of people, you know, not just him, you know, in that space.  And would other people have done it for him? Possibly, possibly not. It would demand a relationship and time spent. And, you know, at that moment in time he probably couldn't get a better deal, but I don't know if that would be the case or not. I, certainly, know people who got similar deals.  But, I think, you know, at the end of the day it doesn't matter because we did not we helped him get started, but we did not, you know, exercise this option or do anything, you know. We null and voided this agreement.  Q. When you say, "we helped him get started," were there other ways in which FXCM helped Effex get started?  A. Yes.  Q. Such as what?  A. We temporarily gave him office space.  We have a department in FXCM called Programming	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Exhibit 38 is GLBR 189079.  Q. Mr. Niv, just let me know when you're ready.  A. I'm ready. Q. Okay. And, as I mentioned, this is an e-mail that you do not appear to be on, but have you seen this document before?  A. I don't recall. Q. Okay. But do you see that would you agree this appears to be an e-mail from Mr. Dittami to David Sassoon, Mr. Ahdout and Mr. Grossman?  A. Yes. Q. And Mr. Dittami writes, "Just to confirm steps for meeting."  Based on the context of this e-mail and the date, do you remember if you attended that meeting?  A. I have no idea. No, I don't recall. Q. Do you remember if you would have been, at least, aware of this meeting?

#### Page 138 Page 140 1 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 1 **CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV** 2 Q. Okay. And in those discussions, 2 FXCM for order flow? 3 3 generally, do you remember discussing other A. How we set the rate I don't recall 4 structural alternatives besides pay for flow? 4 exactly. But, you know, the problem with setting 5 5 A. So, obviously, again, the original rates is that every currency has a different 6 concept was we were going to have 70/30 profit 6 spread and, therefore, the market making profits 7 7 share, you know. But, again, as I explained on every currency is different. The -- how much 8 8 previously, that is just not practical given the volume is done in each currency changes from day 9 9 reality of once he has his own firm and he's to day depending on the interest of clients in 10 taking other clients and that flow from Client A 10 that currency. We don't control that. The 11 is intermixed with flow from Client B, that's 11 spreads change. Market conditions change. So, 12 just not possible -- excuse me -- to 12 you know, in volatile times market makers make 13 13 differentiate between profits from Client A to more money than in dead times. So there's lots 14 14 Client B. of different reasons when, you know -- you know a 15 And, you know, it is also, you know, 15 number would be a high percentage or a low 16 like I said, just something that, you know, just 16 percentage of profit depending on whose currency 17 17 -- and not practical really and not standard in was traded, which, you know, which -- what time 18 the industry. So that's why we -- initially, we 18 day it was, what market conditions were. All 19 19 went through a this should be a profit share to things are just completely un-forecastable. So 20 look like the employment agreement, because 20 they're just not practical to really benchmark it 21 21 that's a deal we already negotiated and worked around a certain number because you have to take 22 out, to that it's just not practical under him 22 into account lots of different things. 23 having his own firm and, therefore, he has to 23 Q. The \$21 per million rate for order 24 24 change into what we changed it to. flow, that was applied to all -- was that applied 25 Q. Okay. And I think I understand what 25 to all of the FXCM order flow that Effex Page 139 Page 141 1 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 1 **CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV** 2 2 you're saying there. captured? 3 I guess what I'm getting at, were 3 MR. DAHAN: When, Counsel? I mean, 4 there other structural alternative other than 4 we know that there's -- I mean, no mystery here. 5 those, you know, that you're -- what you 5 We know there were different agreements, 6 described as the profit share or pay for flow, 6 amendments. So when? I mean, let's --7 7 was there other ways of structuring this MR. BAKER: Yeah, I'm trying to think 8 8 arrangement that were discussed at that time? how to clarify. 9 9 A. I'm sure there -- I have no MR. DAHAN: Pick a time. Pick a time 10 recollection of specific structures. But, I 10 period, that's all. We, obviously, know that's not the case. (INAUDIBLE) So pick a time. 11 mean, these were long discussions over long 11 12 periods of time that, you know, took research 12 Q. Mr. Niv, when these services 13 13 and, you know, lots of different, you know, agreement were first signed, was it your 14 opinions and there -- like I said, there were 14 understanding that the \$21 per million that Effex 15 15 would pay was based on all of the order flow that still arguments going on about what's our 16 ultimate, you know, business goal here, you know, 16 Effex captured from FXCM? 17 because the -- this is too early. This is still 17 A. Yes. 18 2010. So the jury is still out on, you know, 18 Q. And was there a time when that 19 whether external execution is going to work as a 19 changed? 20 20 business model long-term or not. A. Yes. 21 21 Q. Okay. And when you were having these Q. When was that? 22 22 discussions and figuring out how to structure the A. So, as time went on and this became a 23 23 Effex/FXCM relationship as pay for flow, did the big success and, you know, spreads, you know, 24 70/30 -- original 70/30 split come into play in 24 basically, narrowed by about 80 to 90 percent 25 25 terms of setting the rate that Effex would pay over the next few years, particularly, spreads in

	D 140		D 144
1	Page 142 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 144
1		1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	euro/dollar and dollar/yen, you know, obviously,	2	A. Yes, I see it.
3	it became you know, over time we had to make a		Q. Okay. And please take a minute to
4	few changes and it became unattainable for them	4	review. I am just going to be asking you some
5	to pay us more than a tiny fee because they just	5	general questions here.
6	weren't making, you know, that type of money.	6	MR. BAKER: For the record,
7	So, obviously, all market makers, as you noted	7	Exhibit 41 is GLBR 194774, and an attachment
8	previously, make less money on narrower spread	8	which is GLBR 194776.
9	currencies. And as the spreads were narrowing,	9	Q. Mr. Niv, I'll note that you do not
10	you know, in like I said by significant amounts,	10	appear to be on the e-mails. So I'm just going
11	you they could not afford to pay us the	11	to ask you some general questions here.
12	amounts that we initially signed for.	12	But does this appear to be an e-mail
13	Q. Okay. And, I think, now maybe I	13	from Robert Lande to Joshua Rosenfeld and Joe
14	understand where the source of the confusion with	14	Filko with an attachment?
15	my original question.	15	A. Yeah.
16	So regardless of what the fee the	16	Q. And in the bottom e-mail on this
17	specific fee per million was at anytime, was it	17	chain, which is from Alexander Dick to John
18	your understanding that throughout the time that	18	Dittami copying Mr. Grossman, Mr. Ahdout and
19	Effex was paying FXCM for order flow that it was	19	Mr. Sassoon, Mr. Dick writes, "Here is the
20	paying for all order flow that Effex captured	20	updated version of the Services Agreement."
21	from FXCM as opposed to segments of that order	21	And he says, "The PDF version is for
22	flow?	22	you to sign."
23	A. I do not recall a hundred percent	23	Do you see that?
24	everything because there were there may have	24	A. Yeah.
25	been some stuff that's not there that's excluded.	25	Q. And then further up in the chain, Mr.
	Page 143		Page 145
1	Page 143 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 145 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
		1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
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2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  But I don't recall. But I do recall that we did change when spreads on Euro/dollar and dollar/yen became, you know, extremely narrow and we could no longer afford it, we did delineate between those two currencies and the rest of the currencies.	2 3 4 5 6 7	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV  Lande is forwarding an attachment titled, "Effex Services AGMT 17 AUG 10 (execution copy)."  Do you see that?  A. Yes.  Q. And he writes, "This is what we are planning to executing with Dittami."
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Page 150 Page 152 1 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 1 2 2 get the 'service agreement' put in place." you know, basically, depended on how much volume 3 Do you recall that meeting? 3 of trades. So the more -- the tighter the 4 A. I don't recall that meeting, sorry. 4 spreads, generally speaking, the more volume you 5 Q. Do you remember discussing services 5 get. Therefore, we were always better off that 6 agreement or an amendment with Mr. Grossman, 6 way. So we were happy to do it because it was 7 7 Mr. Ahdout, Mr. Dittami, Mr. Meyer in or around happening for the right reasons. 8 October 2011? 8 Q. Okay. And you mentioned a little bit 9 A. I don't. This is, again, ten years 9 earlier that the conversation about moving the 10 ago. I don't recall what happened then. 10 dollars per million came up a bunch of times and 11 Q. In the top e-mail? 11 I think you said you remember doing it two or 12 A. I know the substance of moving -- the 12 three times during the life of the agreement; is 13 dollars per million came up a whole bunch of time 13 that an accurate recollection of your testimony? 14 14 and we did move it a few times during the life of A. Yes. 15 the agreement, I think, two times or three times. 15 Q. Do you recall about how many times or 16 That I remember that we had to do that because, 16 how often those conversations would come up about 17 you know, again, spreads were shrinking, markets 17 changing the fee per million between Effex and 18 were less volatile, et cetera, et cetera, like he 18 FXCM? 19 wasn't making a trade like he thought he would 19 A. I don't recall, you know. 20 make it. 20 Q. Was it multiple times a year, once 21 Q. Okay. And looking at the top e-mail, 21 every couple of years? 22 does this appear to be a discussion about one of 22 A. I mean, John would keep us abreast, 23 23 those instances you described where Effex and you know, that, you know, intermittently how much 24 FXCM changed the rate that Effex would pay for 24 money he was make and how well the market was and 25 order flow? what the situations are. But we also would see 25 Page 151 Page 153 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV 1 1 2 2 A. Correct. it ourselves in terms of talking to other market 3 Q. And this is from \$21 per million to 3 makers and then, you know, getting their lay of 4 4 \$16 per million? the land and what they were seeing, you know, and 5 5 if things were getting better or worse for them. A. Correct. 6 Q. Do you recall who wanted to change 6 And, obviously, again, mix of currencies change, 7 7 the fee at this time? mix of, you know, different things in the market, 8 8 A. John. different issues and so those -- we would talk 9 Q. And do you recall -- did he tell you 9 about the market quite frequently. So I'm sure 10 10 why? the subject of, you know, how is that impacting 11 MR. DAHAN: Objection, asked and 11 his business comes up. How many times did he 12 answered, 15 times today. I mean, do it again. 12 want to change the fee, I don't remember. 13 13 A. You know, again, over time spreads Q. So -- and when you say that Effex and 14 contracted, right, and which is exactly what we 14 FXCM did change the fee two or three times during 15 15 wanted to happen happened. You know, we wanted the life of the agreement, do you recall if the 16 16 spreads to go down. We wanted, right, Services Agreement was amended for there was a 17 17 new services agreement put in place each of those essentially, clients to have cheaper American 18 18 competitive price and that was happening. But as times? 19 that happens, that squeezes the, you know, the 19 A. I wouldn't know those details. 20 20 market makers or the suppliers. They make less Q. Would you expect that to be true? 21 money per trade and, therefore, they can pay less 21 MR. DAHAN: Objection to form. 22 money per trade. So that is the whole point 22 A. I -- again, you know, this is -- I 23 because we would get more trades and the bulk of 23 only deal with the big substantive issues, you 24 24 the money that FXCM made, you know, which is 97 know. I would not have time to worry about or 25 25 or 96 percent, right, was from the markups which, know what documents people were using and, you

	Page 154		Page 156
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	know, like, again, we had lawyers in our	2	know, preference.
3	employment. That's what their job was. That	3	Q. So, in the time that Effex was paying
4	wasn't mine.	4	FXCM for order flow, was it generally true that
5	Q. And so the times that the rate that	5	Effex had the best executions you referred to
6	Effex paid to FXCM did change, were you involved	6	with rejection rates and the other metrics that
7	in or aware of those discussions each time?	7	we discussed today?
8	A. I would approve the change of rate,	8	A. Yes, by far.
9	yes. Again, big substantive issues like change	9	Q. And because of that, FXCM gave them
10	of rate I would approve.	10	certain advantages like winning ties or lower
11	Q. Okay.	11	markups; is that accurate?
12	A. That would probably be the only	12	A. Correct. And we kept that in
13	thing. The only other issue would be the	13	August 2014, we ended payment for order flow and
14	benchmark conditions, right, under which this	14	for the next few years we still gave them the
15	thing agreed rests. So, you know, kind of we	15	same preferences and had the same relationship,
16	obsessed over the we got frequent reports	16	you know, minus the payment for order flow
17	about what the rejection rates are for all the	17	because of that you know, because of their,
18	liquidity providers and we provided that to all	18	you know, ability to make our service that much
19	of them and so they can compare to one another.	19	more competitive.
20	We would you know, all of the, again, sort of	20	Q. So, if they had the best execution,
21	speed of reply, hold time speeds, the for each	21	why did they have to pay you for order flow?
22	maker, you know, performance, how much price	22	A. Because it's standard practice.
23	improvements we would receive, you know, not us,	23	That's what, you know, it's very common. That's
24	clients would receive because of their	24	what everybody does in the market, not just
25	interaction, all of those metrics that are used	25	Effex, in equities too.
	*		
	Page 155		Page 157
1	Page 155 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 157 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1 2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV to, you know, average spread paid, slippage, all		CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. Were there other liquidity providers
2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV to, you know, average spread paid, slippage, all of those things. So we had those discussions	2	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV to, you know, average spread paid, slippage, all of those things. So we had those discussions with people, right, and that was a frequent	2 3	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. Were there other liquidity providers who had worse execution than Effex paying FXCM for order flow?
2 3 4 5	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV to, you know, average spread paid, slippage, all of those things. So we had those discussions with people, right, and that was a frequent because those were the metrics under which we	2 3 4	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. Were there other liquidity providers who had worse execution than Effex paying FXCM for order flow? A. We had some agreements with some
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	to, you know, average spread paid, slippage, all of those things. So we had those discussions with people, right, and that was a frequent because those were the metrics under which we were judged by our clients.  Q. Okay. And, just to make sure I understand, were those sort of metrics for rejection rates that you were talking about, was that tied to the rate per million that Effex would pay to FXCM?  A. Those, basically, underpinned the agreement. So he would have to be the best and the best by far for him to enjoy the preferential status that he received in terms of winning ties.  Q. Was that the preferential status that he received, was that part of this services agreement?  A. I don't recall specifics, but that was the you know, that's how we determined it.  Q. And so, with him to use your words being the best in terms of execution, was that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV Q. Were there other liquidity providers who had worse execution than Effex paying FXCM for order flow? A. We had some agreements with some other people for limited periods of time. But they, you know, we just had this could never come to terms with them on they could it's not come to terms. They could never execute what they promised. So, as you saw in previous e-mails that you showed me, we had different arrangements with Dresdner, with Citibank, with BNP, with Goldman, we had lots of others over, you know, trying to give them either preferential markup or payment for order flow with winning ties and to see if this would improve. You know, they would therefore step up and do much lower rejection rate and much faster response time and basically eliminate if we go back to one of the first e-mails you showed me the two big problems we had, which was spreads widening during market movements in Asian markets and the

	Page 162		Page 164
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	Q. But only with respect to Effex and	2	one taking care of, you know, and so would not be
3	possibly BNP at this time; is that correct, with	3	doing that.
4	respect to the payment order flows?	4	Q. Okay. I'm going to show you another
5	A. At this time, yes, because the other	5	document.
6	discussions failed, you know. And these are	6	(Deposition Exhibit 44, 8/25/14
7	large institutions, they're not going to enter	7	letter to John Dittami from David Sassoon
8	this agreement without getting preferential	8	GLBR_00125304 marked Confidential, was marked for
9	treatment and doing a substantial amount of more	9	identification.)
10	business because this would then not be	10	Q. Okay. This is Exhibit 44. It should
11	sufficiently big enough for them to get into this	11	be up now. Please let me know if you can see it.
12	agreement.	12	A. I see it.
13	You know, when Charles Schwab and	13	Q. Okay. And take a minute to review.
14	Ameritrade and Robin Hood are giving payment for	14	MR. BAKER: For the record,
15	order flow, they're doing it to only a few	15	Exhibit 44 is GLBR 125304.
16	counterparties and, you know, who are each	16	Q. And, Mr. Niv, my first question will
17	getting a substantial piece of the share. That's	17	be, do you recognize this document?
18	why there is that. When they route it to other	18	A. Yeah, I know the I don't see the
19	venues, they don't receive payment for order	19	I, generally, don't recall seeing these
20	flow.	20	documents, but I know the substance of what's in
21	Q. Okay. I think we can move on.	21	it and why we did that.
22	I'm going to introduce the next	22	Q. And were you aware of these documents
23	exhibit.	23	or the substance at the time that they were
24	(Deposition Exhibit 43, Amendment to	24	executed?
25	Service Agreement E Capital-000060, was marked	25	A. Yes.
	Page 163		Page 165
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	for identification.)	2	Q. And is this a letter terminating the
3	Q. Okay. This is Exhibit 43. Please	3	May 1, 2010 Services Agreement that we looked a
4	let me know when you can see it.	4	earlier today?
5	A. I can see it.	5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Okay. And please take a minute to	6	O W
7		0	Q. Were you involved in the decision to
'	review.	7	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex?
8	review.  MR. BAKER: For the record,		terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes.
8 9	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 43 is E Capital 60. It's 6-0.	7	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes. Q. What was your involvement?
8	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 43 is E Capital 60. It's 6-0. Q. Mr. Niv, my first question will be,	7 8	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes. Q. What was your involvement? A. It's the UK regulator made a
8 9 10 11	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 43 is E Capital 60. It's 6-0. Q. Mr. Niv, my first question will be, do you recognize this document?	7 8 9 10 11	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes. Q. What was your involvement? A. It's the UK regulator made a determination that they do not like payment for
8 9 10 11 12	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 43 is E Capital 60. It's 6-0. Q. Mr. Niv, my first question will be,	7 8 9 10 11 12	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes. Q. What was your involvement? A. It's the UK regulator made a determination that they do not like payment for order flow and ordered all of the regulated firms
8 9 10 11	MR. BAKER: For the record, Exhibit 43 is E Capital 60. It's 6-0. Q. Mr. Niv, my first question will be, do you recognize this document?	7 8 9 10 11	terminate the Services Agreement with Effex? A. Yes. Q. What was your involvement? A. It's the UK regulator made a determination that they do not like payment for
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1	Page 174		Page 176
1	Page 174 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	Page 176 CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	to, you know, terminate the payment for order	2	GLBR_00189374 marked Confidential, was marked for
3	flow.	3	identification.)
4	Q. And is this with this document in	4	Q. Okay. Exhibit 46 should be loaded
5	particular, is this a letter terminating the	5	now.
6	resignation letter that we looked at earlier	6	Please let me know if you can see it.
7	today?	7	A. I can see it.
8	A. Again, I have no idea, you know, like	8	Q. Okay. And please take a minute to
9	this is not I mean, that's you're showing	9	review.
10	me two documents I've never seen before. So I	10	MR. BAKER: For the record,
11	don't know, you know. I'm not involved in these	11	Exhibit 46 is GLBR 189371.
12	little details.	12	Q. And, Mr. Niv, take a minute to
13	I know that we terminated payment for	13	review.
14	order flow. That is what I know.	14	But my first question will be, do you
15	Q. Okay. Were you involved in any	15	recognize this document?
16	discussions about terminating Mr. Dittami's	16	A. I do not.
17	resignation letter?	17	Q. Does this appear to be an executed
18	A. That makes no sense to me. I don't	18	Acknowledgment and Confirmation stating that the
19	recall that at all.	19	Option Agreement we looked at earlier today never
20	Q. Well sure. To clarify, there was	20	went into effect?
21	a resignation letter from Mr. Dittami that we	21	A. Correct.
22	looked at earlier today	22	Q. And have you ever seen this document
23	A. Right.	23	before?
24	Q which I'll represent to us appears	24	A. I don't recall the document. I
25	is also Exhibit B within Exhibit 45. And the	25	recall the discussion to not do it.
	Page 175		Page 177
1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV	1	CONFIDENTIAL - DROR NIV
2	first page of Exhibit 45 appears to be a letter	2	Q. Do you recall a discussion I'll
3	terminating the termination agreement.	3	focus you down to the second page here, which in
4	Am I characterizing that accurately	4	the signature block the signatures are in
	Tim I characterizing that accuracy	4	the signature brock the signatures are in
5	based on the document?	5	November and December 2015.
5 6			
	based on the document?	5	November and December 2015.
6	based on the document?  A. I I've never seen it before, so I	5 6	November and December 2015.  Do you see that?
6 7	based on the document?  A. I I've never seen it before, so I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake, because it	5 6 7	November and December 2015.  Do you see that?  A. Yeah.  Q. Do you recall discussions around that time period about executing some sort of document
6 7 8	based on the document?  A. I I've never seen it before, so I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake, because it doesn't make any sense.	5 6 7 8	November and December 2015.  Do you see that?  A. Yeah.  Q. Do you recall discussions around that time period about executing some sort of document like this with regard to the option agreement?
6 7 8 9	based on the document?  A. I I've never seen it before, so I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake, because it doesn't make any sense.  Q. Okay.	5 6 7 8 9	November and December 2015.  Do you see that?  A. Yeah.  Q. Do you recall discussions around that time period about executing some sort of document like this with regard to the option agreement?  MR. DAHAN: Yeah, I'm just going to
6 7 8 9 10	based on the document?  A. I I've never seen it before, so I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake, because it doesn't make any sense.  Q. Okay.  A. I know again, my explanation prior	5 6 7 8 9 10	November and December 2015.  Do you see that?  A. Yeah.  Q. Do you recall discussions around that time period about executing some sort of document like this with regard to the option agreement?  MR. DAHAN: Yeah, I'm just going to  first, again, if you can answer yes or no, but
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